Objective: To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P ( pay-forperformance) program design. Design: We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians. Participants: All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼60%. Results: Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude. Conclusions: Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement.
Introduction
The few systematic and meta-analysis studies investigating P4P ( pay-for-performance) so far have noted that it has been relatively ineffective in driving provider behavioral change in a healthcare [1] [2] [3] [4] . The interpretation of these findings varies. Some researchers have argued that the main reason for P4P not being effective was that the amount of incentives is not sufficiently large [5] , while other researchers have proposed that a financial incentive is effective even when the amount is small [6, 7] . Hence, the key driving force for performance improvements could be how the P4P was designed rather than the size of the incentive. As suggested by some research findings, betterdesigned programs, such as more frequent payments and linking payments to specific purposes/performance desired (e.g. pay-forimprovement) would have been more effective, because they can result in positive physician attitudes toward desirable outcomes [8] [9] [10] . If a good design is employed, the physician's intrinsic motivation could be triggered; this type of motivation may be preferable to only relying on extrinsic motivation that is triggered by external incentives [11, 12] .
As a result, investigating which attributes of the P4P are important to physicians is necessary because many frameworks relevant to a P4P program (e.g. provider attitudes toward the programs) have proposed that if the plan is designed and aligned according to physicians' awareness and attitude, then the physicians' behavior or performance will likely to be changed [9, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . Although one past empirical survey research regarding P4P programs has assessed physician attitudes about the P4P design [17] , the relative importance of the investment magnitude and other design features is not clear. Generally speaking, it is very difficult or not too feasible for researchers to conduct an experimental or quasi-experimental study that examines every attribute of the P4P design [18] . For example, conducting an empirical study, we usually can only focus on investigating whether a certain program is effective and hardly can directly compare which P4P program is more effective: for example, increasing the magnitude of the incentives or changing to a better design. Fortunately, using the study methods on preferences, the most important design factors can be examined and determined [19] . For example, assuming that a P4P program consists of many attributes (e.g. the magnitude of the incentive or the type/ method of the incentive), physicians' preferences not only produce the benefit scores for the alternatives of the program design but also indicate how people are willing to make trade-offs between attributes when resources are limited/fixed. Based on the results of the trade-offs, the preference/relative importance of the program attributes can be determined. This is achieved by using a preference-related method called discrete choice experiment (DCE), which is increasingly being used in studies on healthcare policies and behaviors [20] .
In this study, we have applied the DCE method to explore whether the magnitude of the incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized.
Methods

Study setting
Since its introduction in 1995, the Taiwan National Health Insurance (NHI) program has won widespread public approval for its accessibility and convenience. The fee-for-service schedule was adopted during the initial launch period. However, due to certain factors, such as an aging population and new technologies for medical treatment, medical expenditures have outgrown the revenue generated from premiums. To stabilize the finances of the NHI while also developing the healthcare system, the National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA) has taken several measures to slow the growth of medical expenditures. One of these measures is the implementation of a global budget system, which was adopted in July 2002 to control medical expenditures [21] . Under the global budget payment, reimbursements to providers have been based on this existing fee-for-service schedule, which lists a relative value or number of points for each item of service. The monetary value of each point has been equal to the fixed budget divided by the number of points; thus, the monetary value has fluctuated. For example, a value of NT $0.9 per point means that hospitals/physicians experienced a decrease in NHI reimbursement averaging NT $0.1 per point [22] . In addition, although the implementation of NHI achieves the goal of equal accessibility to the healthcare system, there are still new challenges in the quality of care of the payment. Since 2001, the NHIA has implemented a P4P program. The diabetes program, for example, emphasizes a chronic care model with a multidisciplinary care team and provides financial incentives for healthcare providers to increase the regular follow-up visits including enhanced self-care education and comprehensive diabetes-specific assessment [23] . The financial incentives include four types of fees, as follows: extra physician fees (450 points), new enrollment fees (400 points), follow-up evaluation fees (200 points) and annual evaluation fees (800 points). The extra monetary compensation for P4P is extracted from the beginning of the global budget every year, through a type of quality retention source or a dedicated fund.
Study sample
The validity of the content study was ensured by six physicians who specialized in endocrinology or family medicine. They ensured that the design of the DCE was robust and that the format and questions were clear to respondents. The final questionnaires were mailed to all physicians who participated in the diabetes mellitus (DM) P4P program, which was supervised by the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009.
There were 1570 physicians located within the supervisory area of the northern branch of the NHI in 2009, and among them, the 248 physicians who participated in the diabetes P4P program comprised our original sample population. Four physicians could not be located because they had retired or moved to other hospitals outside of the supervision of the northern NHI branch. They were therefore removed from the sample list (n = 244). The survey response rate was ∼60% (146/244).
Study format and design
The usual source of information on preferences and demand for specific services is market or revealed preference (RP). However, RP data are scare in health because of existence of different P4P design not yet in the market for which market data do not exist. This suggests a role for stated preference (SP), or what individuals say they would do rather than what they are observed to do [19] . DCEs, which have been added to this list of SP recently, have become a commonly used technique to address policy questions [24] . The foundation of the approach is drawn from random utility theory (RUT) [25] . The technique is an attribute-based measure of benefit, based on the assumptions that healthcare services and policies can be described by their attributes and that an individual's valuation depends on the levels of these attributes [26] . According to RUT, respondents are assumed to act in a utility-maximizing manner and to make choices on the levels of attributes in the DCE alternatives. If the attributes are significantly related to respondent choices, the findings should demonstrate information related to how the average respondent's utility is affected by changes in the levels of attributes. RUT assumes that respondent utility can be decomposed into a systematic component, which is a function of levels, and a random component (error term) [27] . Final choices reveal an underlying (latent) utility function. DCEs facilitates valuation of multiple options rather than evaluating a single intervention [19] , and are also better than opinion polls, satisfaction surveys, time trades-off, the standard gamble etc. for eliciting individual preferences under conditions of non-health outcomes [20, 28] . Details on conducting a DCE are covered in articles and books [19, 24] .
The outputs from DCEs can be used to improve the decision about policy making [29, 30] , including estimates of the relative importance of each of the attributes, and this allows the policy-maker to observe the impact of each attribute on the overall benefit [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . In this study, we mainly focus on the prioritization of attributes for P4P design, and hence, we will present the relative importance of each of the attributes to observe how physicians weigh the magnitude of investment and other favored features associated with a P4P design.
When undertaking a discrete choice analysis study, one must first identify the attributes of a P4P program under design from literature reviews, group discussions and individual interviews [37] . The next step is to assign levels to the attributes. Because the maximum number of selected attributes often should not exceed five or six [37] , this study included only five attributes, as presented in Table 1 . The attributes and levels in Table 1 included in our DCE were identified from evidence-based articles. One of those attributes is the investment magnitude (e.g. how much extra money was paid by the DM P4P), and the other four attributes are associated with a good P4P design, including the type of financial incentive (e.g. bonus), payment frequency (e.g. the extra P4P money should be paid on a yearly basis), incentive form (e.g. the non-financial incentive supports the financial incentive) and incentive structure (e.g. pay-for-improvement plus pay-for-excellence).
Investment magnitude as an attribute is similar to the idea proposed by Frolich et al. [18] regarding revenue potential (magnitude of the financial incentive). We used the 'percentage of the total DM care expenditures' to demonstrate the size of the revenue potential. Clusters et al. [13] has stated that budget-neutral, withholding and quality retention money are considered equal. Hence, the type of incentive for Taiwan's P4P is considered to be through withholding because the extra money comes from quality retention money.
To ensure that the individuals had acquired all relevant information before completing the choice sets, we provided a summary sheet of all attributes and levels prior to the main choice section of the questionnaire. Examples of the DCE attributes in the survey descriptions are described in Appendix 1. All of the DCE design details are described in Appendix 2.
Analysis
Because each respondent provided multiple answers, we estimated a random effects model to account for the correlated error structure, which led to significant improvements in fit compared with the logit model. Therefore, we used a hierarchical logistic model to analyze the data. We used SAS version 9.3 to both generate and analyze the choice sets. After calculating the coefficients at each level from the random effects logistic regression models according to the absolute difference between coefficients for the highest and lowest levels, we determined the relative importance of each attribute [42] . Table 2 indicates that 88% of respondents ( physicians) were male, 48% had more than 20 years of experience, 53% specialized in family medicine and 49% practiced in hospitals. Because the DM patient volume per physician may also be an important factor for physicians [43] , we divided the DM patient volume per physician into quintiles to create four groups for analysis. Volume group ranges were as follows: Group I, 1-121; Group II, 122-246; Group III, 247-446 and Group IV, 447+ (data not shown). Finally, ∼70% of physicians thought that the choice-format survey was not difficult, and the average reported difficulty of the questionnaire was 2.9 (a scale from 1 [very easy] to 5 [very difficult]) (data not shown).
Results
As indicated in Table 3 , only one attribute was not significantly different from 0 (incentive form, e.g. a non-financial incentive aid to support an improvement effort). The higher levels and the significant, CI, Confidence Interval. *P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001; controlling for respondent characteristics in Table 2 . Incentive structure Pay-for-excellence Pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement [40, 41] positive coefficients of the investment magnitude, incentive structure, payment frequency and type of incentive attributes imply that physicians were more likely to prefer a scenario containing these attributes. None of the control variables (e.g. physician gender) were significant (data not shown). The most preferred attribute mix contained investment magnitude (7%), having a bonus, payment every 6 months, and pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement. These findings indicate that the most preferred P4P policy in our example was that the extra monetary compensation paid by the DM P4P would be ∼7% of the total DM care expenditures. The monetary compensation would come in the form of a bonus (outside the global budget system), and payment would be on a half-year basis. The money would be paid for either excellence or improved effort. In addition to the monetary compensation, there is a non-financial incentive that supports the improvement effort (e.g. private performance feedback). Table 3 also shows that the coefficient for the type of incentive (e.g. bonus) was the highest of all of the attributes and was therefore the most important design attribute in the P4P program (1.48, P < 0.001). The second most important design was the incentive structure (e.g. pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement) (0.38, P < 0.001). If we compare the investment magnitude (0.15, P < 0.001) with three additional high quality program designs, the investment magnitude was only slightly higher than payment frequency (0.07, P < 0.05).
Discussion
DCE have been introduced and increasingly used to investigate health policy questions. However, the application of the DCE method to physician preferences for P4P design has not been previously explored. Our research found that a good P4P design is more important than the magnitude of the incentive offered by the insurer. Based on the findings herein, the type/form of incentive (e.g. bonus -an extra added encouragement versus withholding -a preventive measure for overspending) is the most important attribute, and the second most important attribute is pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement. These findings may have useful implications for a practical global and varied P4P design.
The significant parameters identified in our results also demonstrate that physicians are actually willing to accept a trade-off between the P4P incentive and the attributes related to better P4P designs. Our study reveals that the important implication for P4P policy is that physician performance could be improved by a small amount of additional monetary compensation, which comes from a bonus and is paid on a half-year basis. The money is paid either for excellence or improved effort. These findings do not necessarily imply that the magnitude of the P4P incentives is not a priority. A higher magnitude of the P4P incentives may improve physician performance [5, 18] , but healthcare resources are limited, and excessive external incentives may also have unintended consequences, such as limiting physician professionalism and autonomy and engendering negative attitudes toward the P4P policy [11, 12] . Hence, employing a good P4P design should be considered first when implementing P4P programs.
P4P initiatives nowadays are applied not only in the USA and the UK, but also in other countries as well [44] . Taiwan's P4P scheme is similar to other experiences developed such as in Ontario (Canada) [45] , Emilia Romagna (Italy) [46] and Australia [47] . These programs consist of a per patient annual incentive paid to providers for ongoing management of diabetic patients according to the diabetes guidelines, including tracking lipid profile, HbA1C etc. To meet these guidelines, the physician must see the patient at least two to four times per year. Successful providers receive an annual incentive of US$30 to 70 per patient. However, the amount of money in those countries comes from a bonus and Taiwan's money comes from a withholding process due to the money is divided by the global budget beforehand. Through different P4P themes, we not only can test the physicians' preference for a bonus or a withholding process, but also present how they are willing to trade-off the withholding process with the size of the incentive.
Based on Taiwan's experience, physicians are very willing to tradeoff between a good P4P design and the size of the incentive. The small amount of money coming from a bonus is the highest priority by physicians than the large amount of money coming from a withholding process. For a P4P program with a large size of incentive as revenue potential, but under the withholding process, the physicians must achieve a certain threshold of service (e.g. perform a necessary number of checkups). Thus, withholding made this part of the revenue seem like it is supposed to belong to the physicians, but with uncertainty about its eventual achievability [38] . In addition, the withholdingbased financial incentive or budget-neutral model is occasionally viewed by physicians as a form of punishment [13] . If a physician does not receive this incentive, then he/she may feel that it is a punishment due to the loss of potential revenue, because of their poor performance or a failure to improve. In addition, we also found that the small amount of money paid either for excellence or improved effort is the second priority of physicians versus a large amount of money paid only for excellence. Poorly performing physicians may not focus on quality improvement, because they are less competent to compete with those already in the top positions. Adding pay-forimprovement to the payment structure may reduce the differences between excellent and poor performers as evident by an empirical study that has shown that this design can reduce disparities in the receipt of incentive payments between hospitals caring for the most and the least socioeconomically disadvantaged patient populations [48] .
There are some limitations to this study. First, the 244 physicians who participated in the diabetes P4P program comprised our original study population. Although the survey response rate was 60% (146/ 244), our study indicates that the personal characteristics (e.g. age and gender) of both responders and non-responders in the northern regional branch of the NHI were not significantly different from each other (data not shown). However, based on the study population, among the endocrinology specialists, there were 43 physicians (43/ 248 = 0.17) participating in the P4P program. In our survey samples, there were 19 physicians (19/248 = 0.08) with endocrinology specialties participating in the P4P. There were differences (0.17-0.08 = 0.09) in the percentage of distribution of endocrinology specialist responders compared with the study population. Hence, our samples were not perfectly representative of the study population, but the bias is limited. In addition, one may argue that there is a validation problem due to the small sample sizes. However, one of the advantages of applying DCE-like methods is that a small sample size is sufficient to achieve validity [49] . Thirdly, the results show that the non-financial incentives (e.g. report card and private feedback on performance) were not significant. Perhaps, using the term 'non-financial incentive' is too broad because the term could include both private information and public report cards. Physicians may value the receipt of private information but may be anxious that their lower performance may be unveiled to the public. Further examination should be conducted to verify this explanation. Fourthly, there are also some P4P design attributes that may be preferred by physicians, such as using composite score designs or patient satisfaction as performance measures [50, 51] . There are two reasons we did not include these attributes in the candidate P4P designs. The first reason is that the maximum number of selected attributes should not exceed five [37] ; therefore, this study included only five attributes. The second reason is that one study proved that physicians prefer the detailed scores of technical quality and interpersonal quality to technical or interpersonal quality combined in a single, composite score. In addition, if physicians can choose between the detailed scores of technical quality or the detailed scores of patient satisfaction as the domain of performance measurement, they prefer using the scores of technical quality to the scores of patient satisfaction [52] . Hence, in this study, we temporarily excluded these two attributes. However, these attributes can be tested using the DCE method in future studies.
Conclusion
Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P design attributes include the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement.
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Background
The NHI is experimenting with programs such as economic incentives to encourage the physicians to align with the guidelines. Later in this survey, we will ask you to think about several diabetes program designs. We will describe some P4P programs and ask you to choose the programs you like best. 2. Summary sheet of all attributes and levels First, we want to provide you with a summary of all of the attributes described in the next few pages. Another attribute of a P4P program is the type of incentives. This attribute has the following alternatives: Table A1 Narrative description Alternative A: the extra money paid by the DM P4P is ∼3% of the total DM care expenditures. The monetary compensation comes from a bonus (outside the global budget system) and is paid on a yearly basis. The compensation is paid only for excellent jobs Alternative B: the extra monetary compensation paid by the DM P4P is ∼5% of the total DM care expenditures. The money comes from a withholding process (within the global budget system) and is paid on a half-year basis. The money is paid either for your excellence or improved effort. In addition to the money, there is a non-financial incentive aid to support the improvement effort (e.g. private performance feedback) 
